A Just War?

What makes a conflict a just war or just another war? Can a just war exist today?

Just war theory was initially created to reduce the number of wars between states, and to ensure that those entered justified the human cost and suffering that war inevitably entails. The principle of just war theory has been around for centuries and continues to shape how we see conflict today. The first principle, jus ad bellum, determines when it is just to go to war and essentially has seven main components. For a war to be just, it must have a just cause, be a proportionate response to a suffered wrong, have a reasonable chance of success, be authorised by a legitimate authority, be entered for the right intention, be a last resort, and a public declaration of war must be made. The second principle, jus in bello, is concerned with the conduct during war, and focuses on the requirements of proportionality and non-combatant immunity. 

                                           

                                                  Michael Walzer on Just War Theory 

Only wars in which all of these requirements are met are just, and are therefore the only ones that states can legitimately participate in. In reality, however, this is rarely the case. It is difficult to find a true example of a just war, in which all the principles of jus ad bellum are met as wars are often entered for the wrong intentions, or for unjust causes.

While it easy to determine an unjust cause for a just war, such as territorial expansion, the pursuit of natural resources, or imposition of political or religious change, determining a just cause is still ambiguous. It is generally accepted that self-defence against a threatening aggressor is a just cause, but what kind of threat warrants a military response? Walzer argues that threats against the political or territorial sovereignty of a state, anything that threatens the common life of citizens, is a just cause for war. McMahan disagrees, arguing that because war creates intense human harm and suffering, the only just cause is in response to this kind of harm, where the lives and human rights of citizens are at stake. 

Responding to anticipated threats, rather than actual aggressive behaviour, is another ambiguous aspect of the requirement of a just cause. A state responding preemptively to a perceived threat can be framed as the aggressor, or as the victim. There is no definitive line to determine when an anticipated threat is serious enough to justify a military response that will cause human suffering. Considering the potential advantages a state may experience as a result of the war can help determine if the causes cited by the legitimate authorities are just or simply masking ulterior motives. Threats can be framed as more serious, thus justifying the need to go to war, if it can result in benefits for the state, such as greater access to natural resources.

Humanitarian intervention is the least controversial just cause, but not all humanitarian abuses receive the same international response. States will intervene in some places, but not in others, and to varying degrees. Some of the worst atrocities committed by states, usually against their own citizens, have been widely ignored, or received inadequate response, by countries with the power to intervene. Often, states only intervene if doing so will serve their own interests in some way. There is an assumption that states with the most power and resources are the only ones with the responsibility to intervene. Reaction time may be slow because less powerful states wait to see how others respond to the conflict first, as each state is reluctant to risk the consequences that inevitably come from intervention, such as their own human cost and expenses. During the Rwandan genocide, despite the human rights abuses suffered by Tutsis, international response was insufficient, left largely to United Nations peacekeepers who were slow to intervene. This suggests that the requirement of right intention is often missing, and states instead manipulate the context to achieve a particular purpose.

                                 Michael Walzer on Just War and Humanitarian Intervention

Developments in global environment, in technology and increasing non-state actors participating in war, for example, have transformed the forms of violence and warfare that we see. Jus ad bellum was developed for traditional forms of warfare, which are relatively uncommon today. Just war theory, therefore, must continually evolve with the context to ensure that wars are judged to a relevant and effective criteria. 

The second principle also presents issues for current conflicts. The requirement of proportionality demands that each strategic military action does not cause more harm than good. This can often be difficult to determine, as it can be impossible to measure the consequences of an action in terms of responses and long term effects.

The requirement of noncombatant community presents further issues, especially in modern conflicts and the rise of terrorism. It seems logical that civilians who are not directly engaged in war activities should be saved from the harm and suffering that trained soldiers face, as they do not pose a direct threat. The lives of civilians, however, are not all regarded equally. We should treat enemy noncombatants with the same respect and expectations that we have for our own civilians. Deaths of enemy non-combatants are usually framed as collateral damage and therefore ungrievable, while we mourn our own non-combatants that are victim to enemy actions. In modern warfare, more civilians are killed than soldiers, mostly enemy civilians, and the numbers of civilian deaths continue to increase with the creation of new technologies that increases spatial disparity between those doing the killing and their victims. 

Graph to show how many civilians have been killed in US strikes, disputing the US commitment to the jus in bello requirement of noncombatant immunity.

In the realist argument, however, it does not matter who is being killed as long as their deaths achieved a military advantage. In this sense, human life is regarded equally. Our determination to separate civilians from combatants may suggest that we see ourselves as morally superior to the enemies that ignore this distinction in acts like terrorism. We are often unsuccessful, however, in upholding this separation. This is especially significant when enemy combatants are identified on the basis of appearance and religion, which they share with other civilians. This reinforces the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’, creating an ‘Other’ group who are inherently our enemies, regardless of their actions and this can be used as a justification to relax the noncombatant immunity requirement.

Just war theory can be both a legitimate international framework regulating war, while simultaneously providing opportunities for powerful states to deceive and manipulate the global context to achieve immoral intentions. There remains room to improve just war theory, possibly through the development of jus post bellum, to address criticisms that the theory currently appears to merely maintain power relations, allowing powerful countries to pick and choose which conflicts they enter as long as there is the appearance of a just cause. 

Laura Lovegrove