Are drones unethical?

Not very long time ago, when I was a kid we went through Waziristan. My father had been working for the Pakistani government, and he wanted to take his friend from Maldives to witness the untouched beauty of Khyber ranges. I was hardly eight at that time, as we drove past, there were children of my age who were standing on the check posts of Waziristan to keep a strict eye on incomers into Waziristan. "We are just going to Khyber pass", said my father's driver. "We have a guest from Maldives", he continues. "And here...", he points out towards a piece of paper. "We have the permission of the Pakistani army", and there we went. We drove through the lawless region of Waziristan. At that age I wondered and felt amazed at the beauty of this arid land. Quite different to the regular Pakistani and often Punjabi landscape, it was sparsely populated. As a child, I imagined myself playing on the sand dunes, and imagined myself running around as our car drove past. "Can we stop", I asked my dad in a very excited tone. "This is not the place to stop", quite clearly we were not in a safe area as I judged from his reply. Our car drove past the region into a much safer compound where the army was deployed everywhere, on the border with Afghanistan.

Cut to so many years later, for my masters degree I had to do a presentation on how drones were unethical in their use. For many years, living in New Zealand and following a western perspective of international news, I always felt that Waziristan was infested with Taliban and extremists. It was the part of my country which I had written off in my mind. Images of terrorist attacks in Pakistan, and videos of Taliban fighters taking responsibility for them, I just did not like Waziristan which I thought was harboring Taliban. Backward, uneducated, barbaric, were some of the terms I used to use for Waziristan. The images of child soldiers, the arid land and the images of guns, it was just a lawless land in mind which had no connection to humanity and modernity. Often during conversations with my brother-in-law (who works in the Pakistani military), I used to argue that it was important that we went after Taliban. He always kept his point-of-view straight, "it is almost near impossible to differentiate between a Taliban and non-Taliban". In a more technical term, I later learnt that it was difficult for the Pakistani army to differentiate between a combatant, and a non-combatant. After undertaking my class in Ethics of War, I understood the concepts of combatants and non-combatants. It was when I realized that it was not really as simple as I was thinking. Anyone wearing a turban was not a Taliban. However, killing anyone wearing a turban could create more Talibans.

Coming from Pakistan, my brother-in-law found it difficult to differentiate between a Taliban and non-Taliban. Then, I wondered (as part of my research for the presentation), how do CIA work out their targets? Is there a slight chance that they could be wrong in identifying targets. Since they are humans like us, is there a possibility of a "human error". And if there is a possibility of "human error", what are the consequences?

These questions ran in my mind as I prepared for my presentation. I also learnt that there had actually been "human error" casualties. It related well with Judith Butler's idea of non-grievable people, where their lives have no meaning to western military and lack the news worthiness for the western media. I also realized that the innocent people of Waziristan had become victims of International Law as well. The drone strikes had been justified in legal and western ethical terms, yet they had nothing to do with humanity.

Such a realization brought me to a conclusion that no matter how much a just war theory makes us believe that a war is just, there are loopholes. And there are people, and organizations that take advantage of those loopholes. And, the people on the disadvantaged end, are the helpless who never get their voices heard. The people that Judith Butler points out towards as non-grieveable, the people of Waziristan, I thought. It brought my attention back to the central question of weather drone strikes are ethical?

Madiha Tahir, who has worked and reported extensively on the subject, finds it frustrating that we see drone strikes in lights of International Humanitarian Law. She argues that we should see the victims of drone strikes, the discourse of drone strikes, and the language, from a different filter than International Humanitarian Law (IHL). She stresses that we need to stop our obsessions with legalities, and to see lives as human lives. We need to drop the legal, and security filter from our news, our discussions and our literature, we need to start seeing things in a less complex and in a more humane way. Furthermore as I realized the human value, I also started to decontextualize the language of International Law where the ability to differentiate between combatant and non-combatant, is not a simple black and white issue as it is taught. If a military official on ground can't differentiate between a combatant and non-combatant, then how can someone sitting so far away, can differentiate from miles above the ground? Given that, my brother-in-law is also very familiar with the local Pashtun culture. 

I cant help but agree with Tahir and Butler, that there has to be a different way of viewing things, a different filter. A way where the poor victims of Waziristan, including the murdered children, are not seen as combatants, but as actual human beings. I now think about the time when we drove through the region of Waziristan, it brings back some great memories from that trip. Unfortunately, I do not even want to think about the children who were there at that time, what have they grown up to be and where they are. Even as a kid, I misjudged them. It was part of their culture, to protect the pride of their people and train as young warriors.

Judgement is an important human trait and human make misjudgments. And, if a human can misjudge, then how can we let a machine judge. Hence, my conclusion for my presentation was that the drones are outrightly unethical. They are unethical because they lack the element to judge, and that they follow a system which is made up of loopholes, right at the cost of human lives. As they say in my culture, if one innocent life is lost, the whole humanity is lost. We cannot afford to lose more humanity!

Written by Fahad Sher Hussain

The Moral Justification for Drone Use

There Are Worse Things Than Death: The Moral Justification for Drone Use

Whenever someone brings up how terrible a war was, they focus on the number of people who died.  When people want to discuss the morals of drone use, they focus on the civilian death toll.  Under international law the rules regarding proportionality, the amount of force allowed compared to the overall objective, focus on costs solely in terms of human life:

“Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.”(The Laws of War)

The literature and academics rarely address the fact that for some of those involved in war, there are worse things than death during conflict.  When discussing why drone use is moral Bradley Strawser argues that the military institutions in the United States have a moral obligation to soldiers to never prut their lives at risk unnecessarily.  Drones, which allow a soldier serving in Nevada to attack militants serving in Iraq in a matter of minutes, help keep soldiers off the battlefield.

“The best empirical evidence suggests that drones are more precise, result in fewer unintended deaths of civilian bystanders, and better protect their operators from risk than other weapons, such as manned aircraft, carrying out similar missions. Other things being equal, then, drones should be used in place of other less accurate and riskier weapons.”(Strawser in The Guardian)

While this is arguably a valid argument regarding the morals surrounding drone use, it fails to address the vulnerability of an often forgotten subset of the population - women and children.  Often times the impact of physical intervention on vulnerable populations is overlooked when discussing the morality of drones.  Patrick Lin and Drew Cohen take up this line of thinking in their articles on the ethics of drone warfare.  They argue that drones are

“unaffected by emotion and adrenaline and hunger. They're immune to sleep deprivation, low morale, fatigue, etc. that would cloud our judgment. They can see through the "fog of war", to reduce unlawful and accidental killings. And they can be objective, unblinking observers to ensure ethical conduct in wartime. So robots can do many of our jobs better than we can, and maybe even act more ethically, at least in the high-stress environment of war.” (Lin: Drone-Ethics Briefing)

This argument shows that because drones are able to separate soldiers from conditions under which they would be more likely to commit atrocities, they can help mitigate the occurrence of atrocities during conflict.  

The flip side of this argument comes from theorists such as Christian Enemark who would argue that emotions are a necessary component of ethics because robots lack the compassion needed to make the decision to kill a human being.  (Enemark: Armed Drones) While this argument may be true for fully autonomous weaponry, I think Lin and Cohen's point is more valid regarding the current use of drones.The comparable rates of PTSD between on-the-ground combatants in Afghanistan and Iraq and drone operators in Nevada suggests that drone operators are not as emotionally removed regarding the impact of their actions as Enemark would argue. (NYT: Drone Pilots & PTSD) They are removed just enough to prevent atrocities, but not enough to encourage them.    

How Drone Use Has Changed Somalia

In 1993 Canadian soldiers were accused of murdering civilians in Somalia.  Four years later reports surfaced that Belgian troops had been committing atrocities against a population they were supposed to be protecting.  Photographs were released showing Belgian soldiers urinating on dead Somali men and burning a man alive over a camp fire. (Justice for Crimes Against Humanity pg. 138)

In addition to these abuses there have been reports of high levels of rape of women and children from soldiers, peacekeepers, and those offering humanitarian assistance.  Thousands of women and children were subjected to severe physical and psychological abuse throughout the decades of conflict in the country.  (HRW: Abuse in Somalia)

Today, America and her allies are fighting to eliminate the terrorist group al-Shabaab, which openly declared allegiance to al Qaeda.  This group is located in Somalia and Kenya and has been responsible for several hundred deaths over the last couple years.  The US has chosen a targeted killing policy (using drone strikes) to help eliminate the threat al-Shabaab poses to stability in the region. (BBC: Who is al-Shababb)  Since strikes began 100 militants have been killed, several of which have been senior members of al-Shaabb.  (NYT: US Targets al-Shabaab) Five civilians have been killed in these strikes.  While the loss of civilians is lamentable, and should be taken very seriously, the benefit of using drones has significant consequences for Somalia.  If drones are able to help eliminate the threat posed by al-Shabaab without putting more forces on the ground, the US can help eliminate the possibility of further atrocities being committed by foreigners.

UN Scandal Surrounding Rape in Central African Republic

“This is something that has happened repeatedly and it happens a lot and it gets covered up.” -Elliot Hill on abuse of civilians by invading forces. 

Obviously this argument creates a significant moral dilemma for makers and implementers of foreign policy. How much weight should be given to each type of atrocity when determining appropriate forms of intervention in conflict?  I'm not trying to argue that it is worse for a woman or child to be raped than for a man to be killed.  Is it fair to say that the rape of 100 women should be viewed as less terrible than the death of a single man? I cannot say what the appropriate solution to this problem is, but it is a problem that has been mostly ignored by literature regarding drone use, and that in and of itself is a problem.

The lives affected by conflict situations are often those of the most vulnerable within the population, but often their voices are never heard.  During peace negotiations, trials for crimes against humanity, reintegration processes, and even aid disbursement, women and children have no voice.  They have no say in the conflict and they often have no say in rebuilding their lives afterwards.  It is important for theorists moving forward to help give this population a voice, to make sure that those most affected are finally heard. Because for some populations, there are worse things than death, and if drone use can help mitigate those atrocities then we, the aggressors, have a moral obligation to do so.

Francesca

Civilians in Pain and Silence: A Critique of Just War Theory.

"[War] is to alter (to burn, to blast, to shell, to cut) human tissue, as well as to alter the surface, shape and deep entirety of the objects that human beings recognise as an extensions of themselves.”

- Elaine Scarry, "The Body in Pain" (1985) p 64.

Instances of conflict greatly shape the lives of humans as well as limiting the ways in which one is able to be human. In this post, I will be looking at exactly this: how civilians are affected by conflict. Undoubtedly, the ways in which civilian lives are broken, represented and reshaped by conflict is extensive and complicated, and therefore cannot be faithfully portrayed here. Instead, I will be looking at the what Just War theory leaves out when attempting to address human injury in conflict: its recognition of suffering being limited to instances of death, the legitimisation of some of these deaths, and the civilian misrepresentation and voicelessness implicit in its normative discourse. It is the facelessness of civilians in such theoretical discourse that is the most damaging: the denial of citizens to have a right to exist with pain and experience, and the removal of their right to tell their stories furthers their injury still. Civilians are commonly the objects of conflict, but are never the subjects. In this way, I do not see Just War theory as only 'falling short' in its representation of civilian suffering, but as actively acting against those living in conflict zones in its theoretical approach to war. It not only fails to amplify the telling of experience, but also acts to silence and reduce. 

When we think about instances of conflict, we know that the pain of subjected lives far extends beyond death. As better described by Carolyn Nordstrom, "The space between violence and theory hasenabled researchers to ascribe a reasonableness to warfare that belies the civilian experience." While theory acknowledges that unarmed civilians become trapped in instances of conflict, modern warfare seems to be increasingly directed to actual civilian attacks, the repercussions of which far extend beyond dead bodies and burnt towns, but also devastates the social and cultural foundations of society, and the cultural and epistemological viability of those whose worlds are on the front lines.

Discussion of the on-going effects of the U.S. invasion in

Iraq on civilians, and the subsequent silencing

of these people in trying to voice their experiences

or response to this.

Just war theory also relegates the civilian to a sub-human status: theorists argue that civilians must not be killed intentionally, however, unintentional killings are justified, as well as those that are considered proportional to the military gains made. Human stories of suffering, experience and injury are reduced to whether civilians physically survived the conflict. Although each civilian has a voice, they are denied their own language within Just War discourse, and many of those like it. Giorgrio Agamben explains that it is almost a condition that civilians be removed from the political process, instead they must be presented in the increasingly meaningless term; innocent victim. Agency is on the side of the military, and the ethics of a conflict (what they may do and what they may do to civilians) is analysed through their prespective.

This term, ‘civilian’, originally defined as a non-combatant, is constantly being redefined and re-purposed in Just War approaches to conflict, in a way that leaves it meaningless to the protection international law offers such subjects. For example, during Bush’s war on terror, and ideological shift was seen where a distinction was made between non-combatants, who were completely innocent, completely uninvolved and those who sympathised with their peoples, their nation, and supported the labelled terrorists politically or spiritually. Therefore, some civilians are far more ‘deserving’ of injury than others, and are victim to the subgroup we assign them to. This means, in the words of Judith Butler, that some lives are “more grievable than others.” This practice has reduced the civilian to an individual who wants to exist and has no agency, identity, or complex ties with the landscape they live in. This practice of “non-combatant immunity”, despite seeming only to want to protect the civilian, instead affects the civilian by producing them as objects that are insignificant and subject to definition: unrecognisable as sentient human beings. They are denied being recognised as culturally intelligent or politically qualified in knowing or identifying their own experience in war or explaining the state they live in and the one they see themselves living in once the conflict ends.

The differential treatment of Nabila Rehman and Malala Yousafazi, is indicative of the limited perspective of Just War theory. While Malala, who talked of her experience living under Taliban oppression was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize, after talking to a full house, Nabila was left to talk only to an empty congress of her pain and suffering from living under drones. While Malala's account is used to reiterate the need for U.S. intervention in the Middle East through Just War norms, Nabila is instead silenced and unrecognised. Drone strikes in the FATA region of Pakistan have killed thousands of civilians and greatly disrupt the social and cultural practices of the area. The numerical data of death, injury and displacement is commonly used (despite being disputed and inaccurate) to assess damage to the area, but this fails to represent further losses. Constant surveillance causes constant fear and anxiety in communities, and cultural practices have been forgone and untaught to younger generations, signalling a loss of cultural identity and familial narratives. What is especially prolific in this case, is the rise of Taliban insurgency in the area, due to more civilians turning to this form of warfare in attempts to retribute their vast losses, and the forfeiture of their lives, meanings and identity by the U.S. government. Just War theory not only denies these experiences of civilians, by silencing it in discourse, but further justifies these deaths as necessary to the War on Terror: eradicating the Taliban. In the linked video, civilians recount their experiences living under conflict to congress, including the famous line, "I no longer love blue skies," indicative of the truly debilitating effect of conflict on the lives of those subject to it.

When we study violence, or its affects, we only count it when it is ‘measureable’, even though the root from which these affects originate is a structural violence that is taught, learnt and embodied into systems, cultures and identities, becoming foundational for rising generations. The War in Syria, for examples, which just passed it’s fourth anniversary has dominated much of the memorable experiences for many child civilians. The conflict, as reported by the Humans Rights Watch commission, has inflicted malnutrition, illness, loss of learning opportunities, psychological impacts, which mean the irrevocable loss of the skills and understandings they will need as adults to reshape their nation, culture, identity and to restore stability to the region. These affects are not acknowledged in the analysis of civilian suffering in Just War theory.

The learnt effects of war are well expressed in this photo, made
famous on Facebook, of a child holding up her hands to save her life
after mistaking a camera for a weapon. it is a symbolic image
to represent a nation desensitised, faceless and ravaged by the violent
proxy-war. 

Such instances show the great affect of modern warfare, which in large is on the civilian, in the form of their 'disposable' status. To be disposable is to be nameless in someone's eyes, even if you are someone to your family and your country: you are still nameless to the people who originally imagines that you were disposable.  When the implicit disposibility in Just War theory exposed, it is clear that conflict and its affect on civilians is poorly understood when done so through battleground casualties or framing through conventional notions of warfare. instead, we need to interrogate the ways in which peoples lives are rendered disposable on a daily basis.

To be indispensible, instead, means to have a name, and to have that name noticed in a way that allows for a recovery of ideas, voice, and most importantly as a complicated self, not simply as the pure victim of war of as collateral damage. When it comes to oppression and marginality, we, as the unaffected, cannot speak for those who are, but not speaking and denying their experience (or categorising and dissecting it) in the discourse through which we analyse, justify and wage war, does not help either.


















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The Dresden Bombings

Dresden: Morally Just?

Historical Overview:

A Lancaster plane dropping incendiaries upon the city of Dresden

On the 13^th of February 1945, British and American forces conducted a two-day bombing operation upon the German city of Dresden. This attack resulted in an estimated 25 000 casualties, and saw to the widespread destruction of a once culturally iconic city. Whilst such activities were common during wartime, the attack on Dresden remains infamously marred in controversy. Arguments surrounding the Dresden bombings are focused upon three characteristics of the attack. These include, the legitimacy of Dresden as a justified military target, the disproportionate exercise of violence, and the indiscriminate manner in which violence was exerted. This blog aims to critically analyse these concerns in an effort to evaluate the moral justness of the attack. 

Dresden a legitimate target?

Dresden after the bombing

Like many other major German cities during the Second World War, Dresden facilitated a wide variety of war factories. These factories, which composed of 127 in total, produced war materials such as aircraft components, anti-aircraft guns, and munitions. Additionally, due to its central location and its extensive railway lines, Dresden served as both a critical communications centre for the defence of the Eastern Front, and as one of the primary transportation centres of war materials to other major cities and battle grounds including: Berlin, Munich, and Leipzig. For the British and American forces, the city of Dresden was thus deemed a strategically important and legitimate military target, of which its demise would hasten the allied victory. Whilst the strategic military importance of Dresden is undeniable, the determination of the moral justness of the attack requires a more thorough investigation. For such an analysis, an examination of the manner and methods in which violence was conducted is required. 

Illegitimate Exercise of Violence Part 1: Disproportionality

Air Chief Marshal Arthur Harris

According to the Just War principle of Jus in bello, the legitimacy of military action is determined in context to the benefits and harms that its application achieves. If the harms outweigh the benefits inferred by its application, then the action is considered illegitimate and morally unjust. In the Dresden bombings an estimated total of 3,900 tons of explosives were utilized for the destruction of the aforementioned military structures. The satisfaction of these objectives however came at the cost of 25-30 thousand civilian casualties and the absolute destruction of the once culturally iconic German city. Given such excessive applications of force and high casualty rates, critics have argued that the Dresden bombings inflicted more harm than its intended benefit was planned to achieve. Naturally, for these critics the attack on Dresden is perceived of as an illegitimate and unjustified military attack, in which the costs far outweighed the supposed benefits. In an objection to this assertion, military strategists such as Air Chief Martial, Arthur Harris have argued the contrary, and contended that the bombing of Dresden was indeed proportionate. For actors such as Harris, the bombing of Dresden not only aided in the advancement of the Soviet troops progressing through the Eastern front, but also hastened the end of the war, saving the lives of countless numbers of soldiers who were still engaged in battles. However, what actors such as Harris fail to account for is that the rights of soldiers and civilians are entirely different. It is from this aspect that we must examine the moral justness of the bombing of Dresden. 

Illegitimate Exercise of Violence Part 2: Non-Combatant Immunity: 

Just War Theorist Michael Walzer 

In the bombing of Dresden, military targets were undistinguished from civilians. In fact, military objectives were centered specifically around high civilian population zones such as the Ostragehege stadium, and the surrounding timbered town of Alstadt. According to the Jus in bello principle of non-combatant immunity, these actions were comprehensively immoral, unjust, and wholly illegitimate. The basis upon which such assertions are made are founded upon the inextricable relationship held between rights and actions. For example, in his book titled ‘Just and Unjust Wars’, political scholar Michael Walzer notes that actions hold within them, the power to determine what rights are conferred to individuals.  This is because through actions, individuals are able to engage in activities that hold the power to relinquish the rights of another. For instance, soldiers by their very occupation are made into dangerous instruments of war. Consequently, their active participation in their chosen profession provides them with the right to kill and be killed by other soldiers. Civilians however have not relinquished their rights through their participation in war activities are thus afforded the right of immunity. Naturally through this relationship, soldiers are accorded a responsibility to ensure that their actions do not harm those civilians who have surrendered no rights, even if it means at greater risk to themselves. In the bombing of Dresden, this distinction was comprehensively ignored by soldiers who actively participated in the killing of innocent civilians. This act in and of itself was immoral, unjustified, and consequently wholly illegitimate, as it destroyed the rights of those individuals who had not relinquished their rights through war time actions. 

Casualties of the Dresden bombings

Final Remarks:

Was Dresden a legitimate military target?  Yes it was. It was a strategic location with military communications capabilities, where German troops were resupplied and war munitions and machines were transported to the Eastern front. Was it justifiable then to attack Dresden? Yes it was, as the fall of Dresden would have accelerated the end of the war and arguably saved many lives. Was the way in which the attack conducted moral? No. Whilst Dresden was a legitimate military target, the indiscriminate, and disproportionate nature of the violence exercised upon Dresden was completely unjustified and absolutely immoral. Whilst it is not possible to completely safeguard the rights and interests of civilians, it is imperative that whatever care can be taken must be taken not to harm those innocent civilians who have surrendered nothing. In the Dresden bombing civilians were the target as the allies purposefully acted in a manner that ensured maximum civilian casualties. Naturally the Dresden bombing can never be morally justified. 

Hey, Just War Theory, When is Mr President Allowed to Kill Civilians?

How does Just War theory (JWT) inform us about one of the most controversial topics in war? When is it 'permissible' to kill civilians?

Perhaps one of the most horrifying aspects of any war is that innocent people die. Those who have no direct participation in the war can still be victims of war. How then is this ever excusable? Just War theory(JWT from here on) is a moral theory that is recognized as the foundations for both the laws of war and ideas of morality in war. Divided into three sections, one part of the theory deals directly with the legitimacy, or lack there of, in killing civilians. This post looks in depth at this particular criteria of JWT, discovering when, according to theory, it is 'permissible to kill civilians'. The post also looks at the problems with the answer JWT provides, and the popular response to civilian killing called the doctrine of double effect. Sprinkled throughout this post are references to the US drone strikes in Pakistan, which helps to illustrate the controversy surrounding civilian deaths in war.



Part One: The Theory

It is important to recognize what this theory is as a whole. This video is an account of the theory as described by contemporary JWT scholar Michael Walzer.  He is recognized as giving the theory, which has a history of many centuries, modern relevance. This video highlights points of the theory that this post will analyze further.

Jus in Bello and the discrimination criterion:

JWT is divided into two, sometimes three, sections: Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, and Jus Post Bellum (relatively new addition, not always referred too). In relation to the civilian, we need to look at jus in bello, in other words morality on the battlefield.

In relation to killing civilians, the first criterion of jus in bello needs to be looked at. This is the principle of discrimination, or the non-combatant immunity principle. This principle entails the following:

1. Soldiers must not deliberately attack civilians. 
2. Civilians are referred to as non-combatants. Combatants pose harm, and thus can be attacked, whereas the opposite is true for non-combatants. 
3. Though some "collateral" civilian casualties are acceptable, there must be an intention to not cause harm to civilians. 

So it seems there is a straightforward answer...as long as the soldier does not intend to kill a civilian, i.e. if it is for all intended purposes an accident, then it is a permissible killing according to JWT. Unfortunately it is not this simple.

War, people, situations are complex, as are issues of morality. Scholars such as Crawford, Walzer, Kinsella, and others, look at how many variables come into play during wartime. Some of the questions that arise are:

• What makes a civilian? 
• What makes a combatant?
• What makes an accident? 
• How can one truly have a good intention? 
• How does one determine legitimate collateral damage?

Thus, following JWT is not exactly clear. This next section delves into the problems that occur, utilizing the example of warfare in Pakistan and Yemen.

Part Two: Blurred Lines

Who is a combatant?

How does a soldier determine who is the target? Easy! They wear camouflage and carry AK-47's, right?

Wrong!

Without the guns, terrorist members dress the same
as Pakistani villagers.
Google Image.

A major problem in the war on terrorism is distinguishing the soldier from the civilian, simply because of the dress code. Does this mean that killing a civilian, thinking they could be a combatant(in the case of Pakistan a terrorist), permissible because there was no clear identification? Michael Walzer claims this is not so, claiming the onus is the government to identify combatants. However, this certainly makes it a difficult task for soldiers and shows the difficult terrain of modern wars.

Intention:

JWT poses that one condition that makes it ‘permissible' to kill civilians, is that the soldier/s do not have an intention on killing civilians. Walzer discusses the problems with this, the biggest being that civilian deaths, though 'unintended' can be foreseeable, or likely, and this in turn renders good intention less valuable for civilian life. Thus Walzer argues that it is not enough to just intend correctly, but that "foreseeable evil"(the killing of civilians) must be limited as much as possible.

In Pakistan, the US use drones to kill terrorists, most of which are embedded within rural Pakistani villages. The info graphic below illustrates civilian deaths as a result of drone strikes from the US. It is a common argument that not enough is being done to limit civilian deaths, as the intention of killing civilians, or the limitation of "foreseeable evil" is questionable at most when it is clear to US military civilians are likely to be close to the terrorists.

https://www.nytexaminer.com/2012/12/nyt-undercounts-
drone-deaths-in-pakistan/

Different situations:

The final problem with nutting out what JWT says about when it is permissible to kill civilians, is when the situations aren’t so straightforward, and when one starts to think about morality a little more.

Crawford, a JWT scholar, examines the status of individuals, and the reader learns from first hand accounts what makes a soldier, for example a naked soldier in bath is not a soldier but a man having a bath, he is vulnerable and human. Does this count as a non-combatant? It did to the allied soldier watching the enemy take a bath.

Furthermore, what makes a civilian? Derek Gregory talks about how the civilian was defined in 1977 with the protocols added to the UN 1949 Geneva convention. Thus, a legal definition was constructed, however Kinsella notes its “in-distinction” between civilians and combatants. As soon as a civilian became involved in hostilities, it no longer was a civilian and could not enjoy the privileges of protection. Thus as soon as the civilian defends it’s self, it is a combatant. Crawford adds to this discussion by looking at how narrow this definition is, what about people who make military weapons? Or ship military supplies? Are they now civilians?

Another question that arises is what if the civilian is forced into a hostile environment, or the battlefield, as Thomas Gregory points out in his Afghanistan article. What does JWT say to this?

Thus, JWT, though making on the surface a clear argument, cannot answer all questions. The problems of distinction in its definitions and descriptions makes it difficult to identify in difficult or abnormal situations if the theory permits killing of civilians.

Part Three: Furthering Just War Theory with the Doctrine of Double Effect

An additional criteria when deciding if the killing of civilians in the doctrine of double effect. Bellamy claims that the doctrine of double effect is used to “judge the difference between unjustified intentional killing and justified unintended or foreseen killing". Walzer draws on three types of collateral damage that JWT may permit:

1. Accident 
2. Systematic failure 
3. Foreseen killing/the double effect.    

The last provides the most insight into JWT. In some cases, where civilian deaths are foreseen, according to the JWT these deaths are judged to be worth the military advantage. This draws into focus issues of both intention and proportionality. The intention is to lessen evil, so efforts to minimize civilian deaths must be made. Secondly, the operation must be proportionate; the deaths of the civilians must not outweigh the military objective. This is contentious but according to JWT is the answer.

Guardian article illustrates the controversy surrounding civilian
casualties from US Drone Strikes.
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/nov/24/-sp-us-drone-strikes-kill-1147

In light of the drone strikes on    Pakistan, the US claim that the civilian deaths are minimal, even less than normal warfare. And any civilian deaths can be explained that they are 'worth' the overall purpose, and are in fact collateral damage. However, there is the argument that killing civilians instill fear and hatred of the US within the Pakistani community, potentially creating more terrorists, thus undermining the justification of military cause.

In Sum:
The answer to the question at hand is that the killing of civilians is permissible if unintended and considered proportional to a military necessary operation. Intention and proportionality are the factors that determine when it is permissible. However not all military situations are straightforward, and problems with distinction in the terms of JWT mean that in some situations it is unclear whether civilian killing is permissible to JWT.

Amy McDonald. 2015.


Sources:
General Information:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-pakistan/

Scholarly Articles/Books:
Alex Bellamy, Supreme Emergency and the Protection of Non-Combatants in War,  http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00421.x/abstract

Derek Gregory, The Death of the Civilian? http://www.envplan.com/abstract.cgi?id=d2405ed

Helen Kinsella, The Image Before the Weapon, https://books.google.co.nz/books?id=gXOuvTbAVuoC&pg=PT301&lpg=PT301&dq=kinsella+gender+innocence+and+civilians&source=bl&ots=ZN00Jz03po&sig=YgirzDyEwg8Kv9uspew05gWqjDQ&hl=en&sa=X&ei=9vNvVY_DG4Sa8QXhpYD4Cw&ved=0CDkQ6AEwBQ#v=onepage&q=kinsella%20gender%20innocence%20and%20civilians&f=false.

Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, https://books.google.co.nz/books/about/Just_and_Unjust_Wars.html?id=AIfexY_mV7AC&hl=en.

Michael Walzer, Arguing about War, https://books.google.co.nz/books?id=sCkI0m7QffAC&dq=arguing+about+war+google+books&hl=en&sa=X&ei=dfNvVfWxNomY8QW_54GYDA&ved=0CBwQ6AEwAA.

Neta Crawford, Just War Theory and the US Counterterror War, http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=145047&fileId=S1537592703000021.

Thomas Gregory, Potential Lives, Impossible Deaths: Afghanistan, Civilian Casualties and the
Politics of Intelligibility, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14616742.2012.659851?journalCode=rfjp20.